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Note

Federalizing Foreign Relations: The Case for
Expansive Federal Jurisdiction in Private
International Litigation
Andrew W Davis*
American legal forums are increasingly attractive to foreign plaintiffs.' Because courts in the United States are more
plaintiff friendly than foreign jurisdictions,2 American courts
have witnessed in recent years a surge in class action lawsuits
involving foreign plaintiff classes. 3 Liberalizing trends in
Europe and elsewhere have fueled the foreign appetite for litigation, but foreign courts remain hostile to American-style lawsuits. 4 The rising tide of global litigation has prompted concern
among American businesses whose products and services flow

* J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1999,
University of Chicago. The author would like to thank Elizabeth Crouse for
expert editorial assistance, Professors Michael Stokes Paulsen, David Stras,
and Fred Morrison for helpful comments, and Lauren for her encouragement
and support.
1. Features of the U.S. legal system such as contingency fees, generous
discovery and class action rules, and punitive damages make U.S. courts an
"extremely attractive forum for foreign litigants." Brennan J. Torregrossa &
Steven Clark, America and England May Be New Meccas for Suits: Claimants
Worldwide See U.S. and England as Ripe for Legal Actions, NAT'L L.J., Jan.
13, 2003, at A33.
2. See id.
3. See Marguerite Higgins, Business Lobby Decries Foreign Lawsuits,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2004, at Cll; see also Curtis A. Bradley, World War II
Compensation and Foreign Relations Federalism,20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 282
(2002) (detailing recent litigation by foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts seeking
compensation for loss of property and personal injuries associated with World
War II); Lily Henning, Antitrust Goes Global: D.C. Circuit Opens the Door to
Foreign Victims of Vitamin Price Fixing, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 13, 2003, at 1, 22
(discussing the use of U.S. courts by foreign plaintiff classes in vitamin pricefixing litigation).
4. For discussion of the trend toward mass litigation, see Charles Fleming, Europe Learns Litigious Ways: Union's Tactic Spotlights Trend Toward
U.S.-Style Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2004, at A16.
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freely in the global marketplace. 5 It has also provoked debate
among courts and scholars regarding the constitutional limits
of jurisdiction over claims brought by foreign parties in Ameri6
can courts.
In recent years, multinational corporations in the United
States have made strategic use of a common law doctrine to
remove state law claims brought by foreign plaintiffs to federal
court. Under the federal common law of foreign relations, state
law claims that implicate U.S. foreign relations provide defendants with a jurisdictional basis for removal to federal court.
Defendants argue that in light of political branch authority in
foreign relations, state law claims that impact foreign relations
impinge on the federal field of foreign affairs. Thus, such claims
present a substantial federal issue sufficient for federal question jurisdiction and removal to federal court. But courts remain divided over the degree of impact necessary for removal
under the federal common law of foreign relations and the
kinds of impact substantial enough to warrant federal question
jurisdiction.
This Note argues that an expansive reading of the federal
common law of foreign relations, granting federal question jurisdiction over claims implicating foreign economic and sovereign interests, is both consistent with recent foreign affairs jurisprudence and practically necessary for the effective
management of increasingly global litigation. Part I details the
evolution of the federal common law of foreign relations and
examines the exercise of functionally similar judicial lawmaking in related constitutional fields. Part II considers whether
federal courts should assert jurisdiction over state adjudication
affecting foreign relations and, if so, how courts should go about
analyzing claims under the federal common law of foreign relations. After examining alternative approaches to the federal
common law doctrine, this Note concludes that a multifactor
approach-one which measures the impact on both a foreign
5. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce recently announced plans to push for
the adoption of an international agreement limiting jurisdiction over international disputes. Higgins, supra note 3.
6. To the extent federal common law is used as a jurisdictional basis for
adjudication of customary international law, the debate has significant impli-

cations for international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. See Curtis A.
Bradley, The Costs of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
457, 464-69 (2001); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARV. L. REV. 815, 842-48 (1997).
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state's economic and sovereign interests-provides the optimal
framework to assess claims that implicate U.S. foreign affairs.
I. ENDURING FEDERAL COMMON LAW
A. THE ROOTS OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
During the first 150 years of American jurisprudence, federal courts had broad power to discover and apply general principles of law. 7 The federal judiciary derived common lawmaking
authority under the widely accepted view of law as a set of
principles discovered through rational deliberation, 8 a view enshrined in the Supreme Court's decision in Swift v. Tyson. 9 Under the Swift doctrine, federal judges discovered and applied
rules of decision without authorization from the Constitution,
Congress, or state court decisions. 10 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins" put an end to this early judicial activism. Erie announced
that the application of federal common law to state law claims
was unconstitutional because such rules of decision lacked
clear congressional or constitutional authorization. 1 2 To the extent judge-made law lacks an explicit constitutional basis,
13
"[t]here is no federal general common law."'

But federal common law has not perished altogether. On
the same day the Court decided Erie, it held that the federal interest in apportioning interstate waters between states provided a sufficient basis for the federal judiciary's continued
common lawmaking powers. 14 But the "new" federal common
law was notably different from pre-Eriejudge-made law-postErie common law derives from the authority of federal statutes,
constitutional text, or constitutional structure. 15 So long as
7. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405-08, 422 (1964).
8. Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE
L. REv. 263, 281 (1992).
9. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).

10. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1625 (1997).
11. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
12. Id. at 78-79.
13. Id at 78.
14. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,
110 (1938); see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27
(1964) (citing Hinderlider,304 U.S. at 110).
15. See Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1626; G. Edward White, The Historical Turn in the ConstitutionalLaw of Foreign Relations, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 133,
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Congress or the Constitution authorizes the assumption of judicial power, federal courts continue to make federal common
law. 16 Unlike the common law created under the Swift doctrine,
however, this authorized federal common law becomes part of
the "[1]aws of the United States" under the Supremacy
Clause.

17

Absent constitutional or statutory authorization, the Constitution provides "structural inferences" authorizing the exercise of federal common law.' 8 In such cases, the judiciary's
power to make common law derives from the strong federal interest in the subject matter and the demand for federal uniformity in that particular area. 19 Given the lack of textual detail underlying the foreign affairs power, 20 the federal common
law of foreign relations is premised on such a structural inference. The increase in case law developing this common law doctrine indicates that with the rise of multinational corporations,
foreign direct investment, and private international litigation,
this doctrine is used with increasing frequency as a litigation
strategy by defendants seeking removal from state courts.
B. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS AS
LITIGATION STRATEGY

Federal courts have limited jurisdiction over cases "arising
under" the U.S. Constitution, laws, or treaties. 2 1 The classic
formulation of a claim that "arises under" is found in Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley,22 which requires the plaintiff's cause of action on its face to present a question of federal
137 (2000).

16. Friendly, supra note 7, at 405-07. For example, federal courts exercise
common law powers over interstate disputes, where judicial authorization is
provided for in the text of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6,
at 842 n.176.
18. See Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1626-27.
19. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
20. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war, to
raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 11-13. It grants the president powers as commander in chief of
the army and navy, and the power to make treaties. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1-2; see
Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 711 (9th Cir. 2003).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2002). Congress enacted § 1331 under the authorization of Article III, which provides: 'The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases,... arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made,... under their Authority." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
22. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
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law. 23 Under Mottley and the well-pleaded complaint rule, a

plaintiff cannot establish a federal claim merely by anticipating
a federal defense, nor does a federal defense establish federal
question jurisdiction. 24 Rather, federal law must itself create
the plaintiff's cause of action. 25 The Supreme Court has advanced the well-pleaded complaint rule beyond Mottley to encompass a state law claim that "necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." 26 But simply

because a plaintiff's claim has some imbedded federal issue is
not enough to establish federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.27
The federal issue requiring resolution must be
"substantial."28 In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Thompson, the Court suggested that a federal issue is not sufficiently "substantial" where Congress has expressly precluded a
federal private remedy for the violation of a federal statute. 29
To find a federal question in such circumstances would "flout
30
congressional intent" to exclude a federal cause of action.
However, the question of when a federal issue is substantial enough to support federal question jurisdiction remains unsettled, particularly where Congress has not spoken to exclude
a federal right of action. The Court has offered little guidance,
declaring that courts must make "principled, pragmatic distinctions... [engaging in] 'a selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside."' 31
Thus, some courts view Merrell Dow narrowly, foreclosing federal question jurisdiction in the absence of a federal cause of
action. For example, in Seinfeld v.Austen,3 2 the Seventh Circuit held that a congressionally created right of action is necessary to support federal question jurisdiction in deciding

23. Id. at 152.
24. Id. The Supreme Court has applied the well-pleaded complaint rule to
counterclaims, ruling that a defendant's counterclaim cannot serve as a basis
for "arising under" jurisdiction. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831-32 (2002).
25. See Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152; Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler
Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
26. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 28
(1983).
27. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986).
28. Id. at 813-14.
29. Id. at 814.
30. Id. at 812.
31. Id. (quoting Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936)).
32. 39 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
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whether the plaintiff's complaint presented a question of federal law.3 3 In contrast, the Second Circuit has found that under
Merrell Dow, a federal cause of action is sufficient but not required to create federal question jurisdiction. 34 Thus, whether
Congress's failure to create a cause of action evidences its intent to foreclose federal jurisdiction remains unsettled. 35 Indeed, Merrell Dow underscored the need for judicial discretion,
practicality, and necessity in making federal question determinations under § 1331.36
The debate over the application of the federal common law
of foreign relations as a basis for federal question jurisdiction is
in part a function of how strictly the well-pleaded complaint
rule should apply to cases implicating foreign relations. 3 7 In the
context of private international litigation, a foreign plaintiff
brings a lawsuit against a U.S. multinational corporation in its
home state court and alleges only state law claims, thus preventing defendants from removing those claims to federal
court. 38 Under § 1441(b), defendants sued in their home states
may not remove to federal court despite complete diversity between parties under § 1332. 39 By depriving defendants a fed33. Id. at 764 n.2; see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 933 (4th ed.

1996) (discussing lower courts' treatment of the role of congressionally created
rights of action in determining federal question jurisdiction).
34. See W. 14th St. Commercial Corp. v. 5 W. 14th Owners Corp., 815
F.2d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 377 F.3d 592, 594-97 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding a substantial
federal interest sufficient to create federal question jurisdiction where the federal tax code is necessary to resolve the state law issue), cert. granted in part,
125 S. Ct. 824 (2005); Bracey v. Bd. of Educ., 368 F.3d 108, 113-15 (2d Cir.
2004) (discussing the differing views among circuits regarding when a federal
issue is "substantial" enough to support federal question jurisdiction).
35.

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 286-87 (4th ed.

2003). The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on this question.
Darue, 125 S. Ct. at 824.
36. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 812-14; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note
33, at 932.
37. See, e.g., Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F.3d 192,
200-01 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Williams, J., concurring); O'Neill v. St. Jude Med.,
Inc., No. Civ. 04-1211(JRT), 2004 WL 1765335 at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 5, 2004).
38. See, e.g., Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001)
(Central American banana workers brought state law causes of action in Hawaiian state court), affd in part,538 U.S. 468 (2003).
39. State law claims between diverse parties are "removable only if none
of the parties ... is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought." 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2002). Because diversity jurisdiction under § 1332 seeks to
protect defendants from prejudicial juries in the plaintiff's chosen forum, this
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eral forum, plaintiffs may enjoy more relaxed forum non conveniens standards and avoid higher burdens of proof and the
strict standing requirements of federal court. 40 Defendants argue in turn that the lawsuit impacts U.S. foreign relations, and
thus "arises under" the federal common law of foreign relations
within the meaning of § 1331. 41 That is, to the extent the litigation impinges on the federal foreign relations power, but is not
proscribed by express federal statute, the judiciary may assert
jurisdiction based on its common lawmaking powers in foreign
relations. However, courts disagree on the foreign relations impact necessary to "arise under" judge-made law as a federal
question. Analysis of this question requires a survey of the doctrine's historical development and application.
C. THE FOREIGN RELATIONS ENCLAVE
1.

Making Common Law in Sabbatino

The Supreme Court first made federal common law in the
area of foreign relations in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.42 Responding to a reduction by the United States of its
Cuban sugar quota, the Cuban government expropriated proceeds of a sugar shipment by a Cuban corporation owned principally by U.S. residents. 43 A Cuban bank brought an action for
conversion of bills of lading to recover the proceeds of the
sugar.44 The defendant argued that because the Cuban expropriation violated international law, the bank could not claim a
right to the proceeds. 45 The bank responded that the act of
state doctrine precluded the Court from inquiring into the va-

rationale is obviated where plaintiffs sue in defendants' home state. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (2002).
40. See, e.g., Armin Rosencranz & Richard Campbell, Foreign Environmental and Human Rights Suits Against U.S. Corporationsin U.S. Courts, 18
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 189-91 (1999); Brooke Clagett, Comment, Forum Non
Conveniens in International Environmental Tort Suits: Closing the Doors of
U.S. Courts to ForeignPlaintiffs,9 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 513, 525-27 (1996).
41.
See infra Part-I.C.2. Federal question jurisdiction "will support claims
founded upon federal common law." Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91,
100 (1972). It is generally agreed that a cause of action implied from the Constitution, federal statute, or the federal common law "arises under" federal law
under § 1331. See FALLON ETAL., supra note 33, at 933-34.
42. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
43. Id. at 403-06.
44. Id. at 406.
45. See id. at 420.
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lidity of the Cuban expropriation 46 since, under the doctrine,
"the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
47
the government of another done within its own territory." The
Court held that, while the act of state doctrine was not required
48
under the Constitution, federal statute, or international law,
judicial examination of the
the doctrine nonetheless precluded
49
actions.
government's
Cuban
The Sabbatino Court, examining its authority to adopt the
act of state doctrine, noted broad foreign affairs powers of the
50
executive and legislative branches, but rejected the conclusion
that issues impacting foreign relations are therefore beyond the
judiciary's reach. 51 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority,
stated that the act of state doctrine is a matter of federal law
with "constitutional underpinnings" within the competence of
the judiciary. 52 International legal issues should not be left to
the possibility of "divergent" and "parochial" state interpretation, and therefore Erie's general prohibition on federal com53
to the act of state doctrine. The
mon law was inapplicable 54
"uniquely federal interests" relating to foreign relations proadoption of the act of
vided a sufficient basis for the Court's
55
law.
common
federal
as
state doctrine
In broad strokes, Sabbatino established the federal common law of foreign relations. The Court's analysis of the act of
state doctrine was based on a judicial assessment of U.S. foreign relations interests, reaffirming the judiciary's power to
make law on its own authority. 56 While neither the Constitution nor federal statute dictated the act of state doctrine, the
Court exercised an independent power to determine that the

46. See id. at 400-01.
47. Id. at 416 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
48. Id. at 421-27.
49. Id. at 420.
50. Id. at 421-28.
51. Id. at 423 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 425 (noting that "the Court did not have rules like the act of
state doctrine in mind" when it announced the Erie doctrine).

54.

Id. at 426 (citing D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,

315 U.S. 447 (1942); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943)).
55. See id. at 425-27.
56.

LOUIS

HENKIN,

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

AND

THE

UNITED

STATES

CONSTITUTION 139 (2d ed. 1996); see also Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1628.
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act of state doctrine was part of the federal common law. 57 The

act of state doctrine was thus the first, though not the last, instance of judicial lawmaking involving foreign relations.
2. Expanding Federal Jurisdiction after Sabbatino
Sabbatino's proposition that the federal judiciary has an
independent power to make law in foreign affairs 58 has crept
steadily beyond the act of state doctrine to encompass a jurisdictional basis over state law claims that impact U.S. relations
with other countries. 59 The federal nature of issues that impact
U.S. foreign relations-based principally on the need for national uniformity and the risks of parochial state action-has
been used to support federal question jurisdiction where no
other basis for subject matter jurisdiction exists. 60 As a litigation strategy, U.S. defendants sued by foreign parties in their
home state argue that Sabbatino allows removal to federal
court of otherwise state law claims, because the federal judiciary has power to adjudicate claims impacting foreign rela6
tions. 1
That a claim involving the legality of an act of a foreign
state gives rise to federal question jurisdiction is uncontroversial. 62 Nor do courts dispute that claims based generally on fed-

eral common law, as opposed to a constitutional or statutory
basis, provide a sufficient basis for removal from state court. 63
But disagreement exists over whether federal question jurisdiction should extend to state law claims that merely affect foreign
relations-whether Sabbatino can be used as a basis for federal
question jurisdiction. 64 This disagreement falls generally into
three categories. First, as noted above, the courts of appeals
have not achieved a consensus on whether a defense invoking
57. HENKIN, supra note 56, at 139.
58. See Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1629 n.47.
59. The Sabbatino Court did not reach the question of federal question
jurisdiction under the common law of foreign relations because the Court had
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See 376 U.S. at 421 n.20.
60. See infra Part I.C.2.a.
61. See, e.g., Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th
Cir. 1997); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 62 (S.D. Tex. 1994); see
also supra Part I.B.
62. See Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 802 (9th Cir. 2001),
affd in part, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
63. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972); FALLON ET
AL., supra note 33, at 933-34.
64. See Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1632-33.
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the common law of foreign relations presents a substantial federal issue sufficient to satisfy jurisdictional requirements of
§ 1331.65 Second, courts have failed to define the precise point
at which claims impacting foreign states will trigger federal
question jurisdiction under the common law of foreign relations. 66 Third, disagreement exists over whether courts are into make such policy judgments in the
stitutionally competent
67
first instance.
a. The Rise: Expanding FederalQuestion Jurisdictionin
ForeignRelations
In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos,68 the Philippine
government brought a state law conversion claim against Ferdinand Marcos, its former dictator, for "ill-gotten wealth" obtained illicitly with government funds. 69 The Second Circuit
addressed whether federal question jurisdiction exists over
state law actions implicating U.S. foreign relations. 70 The court
stated that claims that "directly and significantly affect Ameri71
can foreign relations" fall under federal question jurisdiction,
relying on two distinct grounds for jurisdiction over the state
law claim.7 2 First, the court found that the state law conversion73
claim was completely preempted by federal common law,

since the federal law of foreign relations is so powerful it displaces any competing state law. 74 Second, even absent complete

65. Compare Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F.3d 192,
200-01 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Williams, J., concurring) (framing the debate as a
dispute over the well-pleaded complaint rule and applying a narrow reading of
that rule), with Torres, 113 F.3d at 542-43 (finding federal question jurisdiction despite purely state law claims because "plaintiff's complaint raises substantial questions of federal common law by implicating important foreign policy concerns"), and Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. at 62 (noting that essential
elements of the plaintiffs' claims, if "'well-pleaded,' require the application...
of the federal common law regarding foreign relations').
66. See Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1632.
67. See, e.g., Patrickson,251 F.3d at 803-05; In re Tobacco/Governmental
Health Care Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d 31, 38 (D.D.C. 2000).
68. 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986).
69. Id. at 347 n.2, 354.
70. Id. at 353.
71. Id. at 352.
72. Id. at 354-55.
73. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text (discussing complete
preemption).
74. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 354 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)); Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 376
F.2d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
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preemption, the court stated that the existence of a federal issue in a state-created cause of action supports federal question
jurisdiction. 75 Echoing Justice Harlan in Sabbatino,76 the court
cited the need for uniformity in adjudicating claims involving
the request of a foreign government as further support for federal question jurisdiction. 77 The Second Circuit was thus the
first to conclude that federal question jurisdiction exists over
actions having "important foreign policy implications."78 It expanded the reach of Sabbatino beyond the act of state doctrine,
using that decision as a basis for federal question jurisdiction
over issues that merely implicate important foreign relations
79
concerns.
Since Marcos, courts have diverged in their analysis of
state law claims touching foreign relations. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have followed the Second Circuit approach, reading the federal common law of foreign relations as conferring
federal jurisdiction over state law claims implicating foreign
economic and sovereign interests.8 0 In Torres v. Southern Peru
Copper Corp., Peruvian plaintiffs brought state tort claims
against the defendant in Texas state court, alleging injuries
caused by Southern Peru Copper Corporation's sulfur dioxide
emissions in Peru. 8 ' Defendants removed to federal court, arguing the litigation raised substantial questions of federal law by
implicating the federal common law of foreign relations.8 2 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted two possible applications of the
well-pleaded complaint rule: either the complaint on its face
75. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 354 (citing Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986)).
76. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
77. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 354.
78. See Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Marcos, 806 F.2d at 353), aff'd in part,538 U.S. 468 (2003).
79. See id. at 802; Marcos, 806 F.2d at 352-53.
80. E.g., Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1997)
(finding federal question jurisdiction over state law claim that "strikes not
only at vital economic interests but also at. .. sovereign interests by seeking
damages for activities and policies in which the government actively has been
engaged"); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 62 (S.D. Tex. 1994); see
also Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377-79 (11th Cir. 1998).
But see In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d
31, 36 (D.D.C. 2000) (criticizing the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' application of
the federal common law of foreign relations to state law claims that merely
implicate foreign policy concerns).
81. Torres, 113 F.3d at 541.
82. Id. at 542.
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contains a cause of action created by federal law, or the asserted state-law claim requires "resolution of a substantial
question of federal law."83 Because the plaintiffs alleged only

state law claims, the court examined several factors to determine whether the complaint presented a substantial federal issue, including: (1) Peru's formal complaint and protests to the
State Department regarding the lawsuit;8 4 (2) the economic importance of the mining industry to Peru;8 5 and (3) Peru's ownand regulatory activity within
ership interests, participation,
86
the country's mining industry.
While no one factor was determinative,8 7 the Torres court
found the sum of these factors sufficient to create a substantial
question of federal law by implicating the federal common law
of foreign relations.8 8 Thus, to the extent state law claims affect
89
the "vital economic and sovereign interests" of foreign states,
the court affirmed the district court's finding of federal question
jurisdiction over the state law claims. 90 Following the Torres
court's analysis, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have proceeded cautiously, 9 1 affirming a multifactor, case-by-case approach to determining whether a state claim raises a substanlaw under the federal common law of
tial question of federal
92
foreign relations.

83. Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983)).
84. Id. at 542-43.
85. Id. at 543 (noting that the mining industry is critical to Peru's economy, contributing "up to 50% of its export income and 11% of its gross domestic product").
86. Id. (stating that Peru owned the land, minerals, and refinery involved
in Southern Peru Copper Corporation's mining activities, and extensively
regulated the mining industry during the period in question).
87. See id.
88. Id. at 542-43.
89. Id. at 543 n.8.
90. Id. at 543.
91. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 115 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir.
1997), vacated 129 F.3d 746 (en banc) (noting that the Torres holding is "a
very specific application of the well-pleaded complaint rule" under which the
state law claim necessarily requires "'resolution of a substantial question of
federal law"') (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983)).
92. See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377-79 (11th Cir.
1998).
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b.

The Demise: RetractingFederal Question Jurisdiction
Other courts view the use of Sabbatino as a basis for federal question jurisdiction as stretching the doctrine of the federal common law of foreign relations too far. 93 The Ninth Circuit has offered the most explicit rejection of an expansive
reading of the federal common law of foreign relations. 94 In Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., Latin American banana workers
brought a class action in a Hawaiian state court alleging injuries caused by exposure to a toxic pesticide used by the Dole
Food Company.9 5 Dole removed the action to federal court, invoking the federal common law of foreign relations as a basis of
federal question jurisdiction under § 1331.96 The district court
denied the workers' motion to remand and dismissed the case
on forum non conveniens grounds. 97 The Ninth Circuit reversed, remanding the class action to state court, 98 and criticizing the federal common law doctrine as used by defendants to
remove actions to federal court.99
Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Alex Kozinski offered
several explicit criticisms of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits'
expansive approach to the federal common law of foreign relations. First, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal
courts may not exercise jurisdiction unless a federal right or
immunity is an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action. 0 0 The court had no doubt that the plaintiffs' complaint
arose under state law,' 0 ' characterizing the approach of the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits as an exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule. 102 Second, the Ninth Circuit read Sabbatino as
extending federal question jurisdiction only to acts of foreign
states given legal force in U.S. courts. 0 3 This narrow reading
construed Marcos as concerned primarily with an act of the
93. See, e.g., In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 100 F.
Supp. 2d 31, 37 (D.D.C. 2000).
94. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 799-803 (9th Cir. 2001),
affd in part,538 U.S. 468 (2003).
95. Id. at 798.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 808-09.
99. Id. at 801-05.
100. Id. at 799 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 11 (1983)).

101. Id.
102. Id. at 801.
103. See id. at 795.
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Philippine government-an extension of the act of state doctrine.10 4 Although the Marcos court "clearly said more" than
this, 105 its suggestion that a case affecting U.S. foreign relaquestion jurisdiction "reads far too
tions establishes federal
10 6
Sabbatino."'
into
much
Third, the Patricksoncourt stated that while Congress has
in certain instances provided statutory grants of jurisdiction
over cases implicating foreign relations, 10 7 it had not granted
federal question jurisdiction over suits in which the federal
common law of foreign relations may arise. 0 8 Congress could
have spoken to the issue of federal jurisdiction over such claims
but declined to grant power to the federal judiciary in such
matters. 109
Finally, the court criticized an expansive approach to the
federal common law of foreign relations on grounds of institutional competence. 1 10 Characterizing the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits' inquiries as whether a foreign government is "pleased
or displeased by the litigation," the court rejected the notion
that federal courts were competent to make inherently political
judgments about when foreign nations will be offended by litigation."' And because federal and state courts are equally bad
at making such judgments, the Patricksoncourt suggested that
the lack of federal superiority precludes federal question jurisdiction.

104. Id. at 801. According to the court, the Second Circuit's decision was
grounded in the act of state doctrine "[b]ecause the Republic's claims rested on

the Philippine executive order." Id. (citing Republic of Philippines v. Marcos,
806 F.2d 344, 354 (2d Cir. 1986)).
105. Id. at 802.

106. Id.
107. Id. at 803. The court cited as examples of such statutory grants of federal jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(1) (2002) (jurisdiction over suits in which
ambassadors or other foreign government officials are parties); § 1351 (jurisdiction over suits against foreign consuls or diplomats); and § 1350 (jurisdiction over suits brought by an alien for torts committed in violation of international law).
108. Patrickson,251 F.3d at 803.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 803-05; see also In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs
Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d 31, 38 (D.D.C. 2000).
111. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 804; In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care
Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
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D. DORMANT POWER AND PREEMPTION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS

While the line of cases following Sabbatino concerns the
federal judiciary's power to exercise jurisdiction over state law
claims under the federal common law of foreign relations, federal courts have exercised a "similar foreign relations lawmaking power" in cases involving the dormant foreign affairs
power. 112 Courts invoke the dormant foreign affairs power
when states legislate in areas touching foreign relations which
the federal government has not addressed. 113 An examination
of dormant foreign affairs jurisprudence reveals that it is functionally equivalent to the Court's application of the federal
common law of foreign relations. Both the federal common law
of foreign relations and the dormant foreign affairs power are
judge-made federal law, relying on independent assessments of
foreign policy implications, subject to congressional revision,
and based on judicial authority derived from constitutional
structure. 114 Moreover, the dormant foreign affairs power is a
useful analogy for examining alternative grounds for removal
jurisdiction and developing a more flexible jurisdictional standard for claims implicating the federal common law of foreign
relations.
1. Dormant Powers and Foreign Affairs
While Article I gives Congress authority to regulate both
domestic and international commerce,115, the Supreme Court
has read in that grant of power a "dormant" component. Under
the dormant Commerce Clause, even in the absence of federal
legislation, attempts by states to regulate commerce may be restricted. 116 Where Congress has not spoken directly to state
regulation of commerce, courts must make independent determinations regarding whether such regulations should be nationally uniform.117 Courts generally invalidate state regula112. See Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1629.
113. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968).
114. See Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1630-31.
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes. .

").

116. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 109597 (1986).
117. The Supreme Court articulated this need for national uniformity in
Cooley v. Bd. ofPort Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 314 (1852).
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1 18
tions that facially discriminate on the basis of geography,

and examine the purpose and effects of state laws that are not
facially discriminatory. 1 9 Congress has power to repudiate or
modify what courts say the dormant Commerce Clause would

forbid. 120 Unlike the Commerce Clause, the Constitution provides little textual detail establishing a federal foreign affairs
power. 121 Courts have nonetheless read such power into the
Constitution, 1 22 and have applied it to preempt state regula123
Significantly, a
tions that impact U.S. foreign relations.
broad reading of dormant foreign affairs preemption suggests
an alternative basis for removal of a claim implicating the federal common law of foreign relations.
The Court has recently clarified when a cause of action
may be removed to federal court under the doctrine of complete
preemption. 124 Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a de25
fense of conflict preemption is not removable to federal court.1
However, when a federal statute provides an exclusive cause of
118. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)
(establishing a "virtually per se rule of invalidity" for state law that "overtly
blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders").
119. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S 137, 142 (1970). The dormant
foreign Commerce Clause substantially parallels its domestic counterpart. See
HENKIN, supra note 56, at 158-62.
120. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 572 (1997); HENKIN, supra note 56, at 135.
121. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003); Deutsch v.
Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 711 (9th Cir. 2003); Bradley, supra note 3, at 28586.
122. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
123. Under the Supremacy Clause, an express provision of federal law that
conflicts with state law preempts that state law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Where no express federal provision exists, courts have determined that state
law is nonetheless preempted when Congress intends federal law to "occupy
the field," even where the state law does not conflict with federal legislation.
See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (quoting
California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989)); HENKIN, supra note 56,
at 157-58 (suggesting that acts of Congress, treaties, executive agreements,
and even judicial doctrines might suffice to "occupy[ ] the field" in foreign relations). Such instances of conflict or "statutory" preemption are distinguished
from "dormant" preemption, in which state legislation is invalidated despite
the absence of federal legislation because the state law infringes more generally upon some federal power. See generally Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign
Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 203-04 (discussing statutory and
dormant preemption in the context of foreign relations).
124. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2003).
125. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1987); Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13, 26 (1983).
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action for a claim brought under state law, such claim is removable to federal court under complete preemption. 126 While
lower courts' complete preemption analysis focused narrowly on
whether Congress intended a cause of action to be removable, 12 7 the Court in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson suggested a broader standard. Although congressional intent remains the "touchstone" of preemption analysis, 128 the Court
extended complete preemption removal to instances: (1) where
Congress explicitly provides for removal in federal legislation;129 and (2) where Congress intends a federal cause of action

exclusive to state actions. 3 0 Thus, by changing the inquiry

from an intent to remove to an intent to exclude, Beneficial
blurs the line between complete preemption and ordinary
statutory preemption. In other words, a finding of conflict between state and federal law may imply congressional intent to
exclude the state cause of action.' 3 ' Moreover, a post-Beneficial
reading of dormant foreign affairs preemption, premised on exclusive federal power in foreign relations, suggests that state
law claims impacting foreign relations may be removable by
complete preemption.

126. See FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23-26; Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987); Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557,
559-60 (1968).
127. See, e.g., Anderson v. H & R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1042 (11th Cir.
2002) (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393), rev'd sub nom. Beneficial Nat7
Bank, 539 U.S. at 1 (2003); Johnson v. Baylor Univ., 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th
Cir. 2000); BLAB T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc.,
182 F.3d 851, 857 (11th Cir. 1999). Lower courts have struggled to develop
analytical frameworks to determine precisely when state law causes of action
are preempted by federal law. See Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading:A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1797-98 (1998). Courts are
generally reluctant to interfere with state sovereignty and the plaintiff's
status as master of the complaint, see id. at 1798, and have grappled with the
"necessary quantum of congressional intent" that will support complete preemption removal. Id. at 1797 n. 109 (citation omitted).
128. See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66.
129. Beneficial, 539 U.S. at 6 (citing the Price-Anderson Act as authorizing
removal jurisdiction "over tort actions arising out of nuclear accidents").
130. Id. at 9 n.5 (stating that the "proper inquiry focuses on whether Congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive rather than on
whether Congress intended that the cause of action be removable").
131. See id. at 21 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the proposition that
"the existence of a pre-emptive federal cause of action causes the invalid assertion of a state cause of action to raise a federal question").
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2. The Court's Dormant Foreign Affairs Power
The Supreme Court in Zschernig v. MillerI32 first recognized a dormant foreign affairs power and its correlative foreign affairs preemption doctrine. The Court addressed the constitutionality of an Oregon probate statute that denied
inheritance rights to heirs in Communist countries if they could
not show that those countries established reciprocal inheritance rights for Americans. 13 3 Despite the absence of federal
statutes or treaties regulating probate laws, Justice Douglas
stated that the Oregon law constituted "judicial criticism" of
foreign states. 3 4 The Court therefore struck the probate law as
a state intrusion into the field of foreign affairs. 135
Similar to cases implicating the federal common law of foreign relations, Zschernig relied on the judiciary's power to
make an independent assessment of the impact of a state law
on foreign relations. 136 Although the Court did not articulate a
test for determining when the foreign affairs power preempts
state law, it noted that the Oregon probate law had more than
"some incidental or indirect effect" on foreign states. 137 Thus,
while Zschernig did not address questions of federal jurisdiction over state law claims, it established a broad foreign affairs
field preempting state law with even incidental effects on for138
eign relations.
The Supreme Court recently affirmed its power to independently assess and ultimately invalidate state law under the
dormant foreign affairs power. In American Insurance Ass'n v.
Garamendi, the Court addressed California's Holocaust Victim
Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA), which required insurers
doing business in the State to disclose information about policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945.139 American and
European insurance companies challenged the constitutionality

132. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
133. Id. at 430 n.1.
134.

Id. at 440.

135. Id. at 432.
136.

See HENKIN, supra note 56, at 135 n.15; Goldsmith, supra note 10, at

1629.
137. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517
(1947)); see also Bradley, supra note 3, at 286.
138. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 417-18 (2003).
139. Id. at 401. The California law sought to ensure that insurers or their
related companies involved in the seizure of Jewish life insurance policies in
Nazi Germany were disclosed to the State. Id. at 410.
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of HVIRA in federal court, arguing that it violated both the federal foreign affairs power and the Commerce Clause. 140 Although the executive branch had agreed with Germany to address such insurance claims, these executive agreements
included no explicit preemption clause, prompting defendants
to rely on Zschernigs general prohibition of interference with
14
U.S. foreign policy. '
The Court affirmed its broad reading of the preemption
doctrine in the field of foreign affairs, 142 but on the narrower
grounds of conflict with an executive statement of foreign pol-

icy. 143 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, stated that the

need for national uniformity required state laws affecting for44
eign affairs to yield to the federal foreign relations power.
The Court further noted that under Zschernig, state action is
preempted, even in the absence of federal activity, as long as
the state law has more than incidental effects in foreign affairs. 145 Justice Souter also recognized disagreement over
whether invalidation of state law under the foreign affairs
power requires choosing between the theories of field and conflict preemption. 146 Although resolution of HVIRA did not require answering this question, the Court suggested a balancing
test for determining when state action is preempted under foreign affairs powers. 147 Such a test would require conflict preemption in areas of traditional state legislation, and field pre-

140. Id. at 412.
141. Id. at 416-18. According to the Court, "valid executive agreements are
fit to preempt state law, just as treaties are, and if the agreements here had

expressly preempted laws like HVIRA, the issue would be straightforward."
Id. at 416-17 (footnote omitted).
142. Id. at 418.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 413-14.
145. Id. at 418; cf. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376
(2000) (invalidating a Massachusetts law that restricted state agencies from
purchasing goods or services from Burma on grounds that the law conflicted
with a federal sanctions statute against Burma, but declining to reach the issue of dormant preemption).
146. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419-20. The dispute in Zschernig was between Justice Harlan, who argued that preemption was unwarranted in the
absence of some conflicting federal action, and the Zschernig majority, which
established a broad field preemption. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,
459-60 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
147. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 (citing HENKIN, supra note 56, at
164).
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emption where a state has "no serious claim" to a traditional
state responsibility. 148

Thus, recent treatment of the dormant foreign affairs
power suggests an alternative framework for examining the judiciary's role in foreign relations, and provides support for removal jurisdiction over claims impacting the federal common
law of foreign relations. Like the Court's dormant foreign affairs analysis, the federal common law of foreign relations is
judge-made federal law authorized by the structure of the Constitution. While the analyses are not identical, 149 both rely on
independent assessments of foreign policy questions, seeking to
ensure uniformity in foreign relations and subject to congressional revision. 150 And while Garamendi does not deal expressly with federal jurisdiction, its broad reading of the foreign affairs power and its dormant preemption analysis
supports expansive federal jurisdiction over the federal common law of foreign relations. 15 1
II. FEDERALIZING FOREIGN RELATIONS
A. LEGITIMIZING AN EXPANSIVE APPROACH TO THE FEDERAL
COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

A narrow reading of the federal common law of foreign relations criticizes the doctrine's procedural and practical shortcomings. 152 Thus, a state law claim directly concerning the actions of a foreign state is substantial enough to raise a federal
question, while a lawsuit that merely impacts a foreign state's
economy, invokes sovereign protests, or has some other impact

148.

Id. at 419 n.11 (citing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 459 (Harlan, J., concur-

ring)).
149. Dormant foreign affairs preemption requires "more than incidental"
effects on foreign relations, see id. at 418, while an action under the federal
common law of foreign relations must "strike[ ] ... at vital economic... [and]
sovereign interests." See Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 543
(5th Cir. 1997).

150. See Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1630-31. Congressional power to revise Court decisions in foreign affairs stems from the justification of the judiciary's common lawmaking authority in foreign affairs, i.e., protecting the po-

litical branches and insuring national uniformity in foreign affairs. See id. at
1630 n.56.
151. See supra Part I.C.2.
152. See Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 200-01
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (Williams, J., concurring); Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251
F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2001), aff'd in part, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
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on foreign relations will not raise a federal question. 153 This
approach gives short shrift to the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Moreover, it overlooks the increasing likelihood that some private international litigation will have a major impact on a foreign state's economic and sovereign interests, warranting federal jurisdiction.
In contrast, an expansive application of the federal common law of foreign relations, granting federal question jurisdiction over claims implicating foreign economic and sovereign interests, is consistent with the Court's constitutionally related
foreign affairs jurisprudence. An examination of: (1) judicial
competence to measure foreign relations; (2) the applicable
standards for the well-pleaded complaint rule; and (3) alternative grounds for removal jurisdiction, supports the continued
use of the federal common law doctrine as a valid basis for removal. A multifactor approach to the federal common law of
foreign relations relies on the judiciary's ability to gauge the
empirical impact of litigation on foreign states. This approach
not only allows for pragmatic management of increasing global
litigation, but it also remains subject to political branch revision, posing little threat to "political branch hegemony 154 in
foreign affairs.
1.

Institutional Competence as a Matter of Policy

Courts and scholars have balked at the federal judiciary's
capacity to evaluate foreign policy implications. Critics contend
that federal courts are institutionally incompetent to confer
federal question jurisdiction under the federal common law of
foreign relations because courts: (1) lack expertise to decipher
when and how a claim implicates foreign relations; (2) lack authority to make "inherently political" judgments in foreign affairs; 155 and (3) have no particular advantage over state courts
to deal with such claims. 156 Moreover, simply removing a state
153. See Patrickson,251 F.3d at 800.
154. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 861.
155. Although issues involving foreign relations may present political questions, making those issues inappropriate for judicial review, the Supreme
Court has limited the application of the political question doctrine in foreign
relations. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 143-46, 155-56. Specifically,
the political question doctrine has been limited to: (1) determination of when
wars begin or end; (2) recognition of foreign governments; (3) ratification and
interpretation of treaties; and (4) challenges to the president's war powers,
making those issues nonjusticiable. See id. at 156-58.
156. See Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 803-05; In re Tobacco/Governmental
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law claim to federal court gives no assurance it will have less

effect on foreign relations. 157 While these criticisms raise valid
concerns regarding both separation of powers and the allocation of power between state and federal government, 158 they
generally misconstrue the expansive approach to the federal
common law of foreign relations as a basis for federal question
jurisdiction. 159
First, an expansive approach to claims implicating foreign
affairs has gradually evolved from an emphasis on foreign protests to the lawsuit 160 to an evaluation of multiple factors to
measure the impact of such a lawsuit on the state's economic
and sovereign interests. 6 1 The Torres court specifically noted
that the protests of a foreign state could not be determinative
in its analysis. 62 Rather, foreign opposition to domestic litigation serves merely to alert the court to the potential impact
such litigation might have on that country's economic and sov163
ereign interests.
Second, a multifactor approach to the federal common law
doctrine requires judicial determinations wholly within the
competence of the federal courts. Courts consider factors including: (1) the economic importance of an industry to the foreign state; (2) the foreign government's regulatory interests in
the industry; and (3) the foreign government's sovereign interests in the litigation. 164 None of these is inherently beyond the
ability of the federal judiciary to measure empirical effects,
Health Care Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d 31, 38 (D.D.C. 2000); Bradley, supra
note 3, at 287-88.
157. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 803.
158. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 6, at 466-69 (arguing that courts should
not apply the federal common law of foreign relations because they are acting

as legislators).
159. See Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 804 & n.9 (characterizing the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuit approach as inquiring whether a foreign sovereign is
"pleased or displeased by the litigation," and "[i]nviting foreign states to tell us

how litigation in our courts affects their interests").
160.

Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 62 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (stating

that Ecuador's official protests to litigation threatens U.S. foreign relations
interests and gives rise to a federal question).
161. See, e.g., Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377-79 (11th
Cir. 1998) (applying multiple factors to determine whether a claim implicating
foreign relations is substantial enough to arise under the federal common law
of foreign relations); Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th
Cir. 1997) (same).

162. Torres, 113 F.3d at 542-43 (5th Cir. 1997).
163. See id. at 543.
164. See id. at 542-43.
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costs, and the overall impact of litigation on a foreign sovereign. 16 5 Similarly, the limited judicial role in foreign affairs is
premised in part on a broad policy goal of federal uniformity in
foreign affairs. Thus, to the extent judicial decisions under the
federal common law of foreign relations seek merely to protect
this uniformity, courts are competent as a matter of policy to
make such determinations.
Finally, state courts are substantially less competent than
federal courts to adjudicate issues implicating foreign relations.
Disparate state laws on issues from res judicata to punitive
damages risk exposing foreign states to inconsistent obligations, thus warranting national uniformity in foreign relations
achieved through federal court jurisdiction. Even assuming
state courts may effectively adjudicate claims touching foreign
relations, such competence does not undermine the validity of
federal question jurisdiction over such claims. State courts are
competent to apply federal law, including-theoretically at
least-a claim pertaining to the federal common law of foreign
relations. But a defendant wishing to remove that claim to federal court is not precluded from doing so on grounds that a
state court is equally competent to adjudicate the claim.
Thus, criticisms of the federal common law of foreign relations on grounds of institutional competence generally misconstrue an expansive approach by focusing on foreign protests to
the litigation. Further, the competence of federal courts in foreign relations is similar to other functionally similar areas of
constitutional jurisprudence, such as the dormant Commerce
Clause and dormant foreign affairs powers, in which the judiciary has the competence and authority to make independent assessments of state regulation as a matter of policy. 16 6 To the ex-

tent that the federal common law of foreign relations seeks to
promote national uniformity in foreign relations, federal courts
are entrusted with the authority and competence to further
that goal.

165. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 422-23 (2003);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 149 (noting that many foreign policy questions presented to courts do not involve matters of expertise but rather pose
questions of interpretation) (citing Louis Henkin, Is There a PoliticalQuestion
Doctrine?,85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976)).
166. See HENKIN, supra note 56, at 135; Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1628-
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2. Federal Common Law as Jurisdictional Hook
Courts and scholars disagree over whether Sabbatino and
the federal common law of foreign relations should be used as a
basis for federal question jurisdiction. 167 As a jurisdictional issue, the dispute can be framed largely as disagreement over the
168
appropriate application of the well-pleaded complaint rule.
In other words, no consensus exists on the degree or kind of
impact on foreign relations necessary to constitute a substantial issue of federal law. Under a narrow reading of the federal
common law of foreign relations, federal courts lack federal
question jurisdiction absent explicit congressional action creating jurisdiction over matters that merely implicate foreign relations. 169 This approach echoes an application of Merrell Dow
that requires a private right of action to find a "substantial"
federal issue. 170 On the other hand, a multifactor approachgranting federal question jurisdiction over claims that strike at
the vital economic and sovereign interests of a foreign state
even without a congressionally created remedy-applies a more
171
flexible reading of the well-pleaded complaint rule, in which
a federal right of action is sufficient, but not necessary, to constitute a substantial federal issue.172 This expansive approach
to the federal common law of foreign relations should therefore
generally take into consideration the complexity of the litigajurisdiction, the increased caseload resulting from a grant of173
tion, and the importance of the federal issues at stake.

167. Some commentators have criticized the federal common law of foreign
relations as a form of protective jurisdiction that seeks to promote federal interests by granting a federal forum to claims that do not otherwise meet Article III requirements-and which has been rejected as a jurisdictional basis by
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Andrew C. Baak, The Illegitimacy of Protective
Jurisdictionover ForeignAffairs, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1487, 1504-06 (2003).
168. See, e.g., Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F.3d 192,
200-01 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Williams, J., concurring); Patrickson v. Dole Food Co.,
251 F.3d 795, 803 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'd in part, 538 U.S. 468 (2003); Torres,
113 F.3d at 542-43; Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 62 (S.D. Tex.
1994).
169. See Patrickson,251 F.3d at 803.
170. See id.
171. See Torres, 113 F.3d at 543; Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. at 63; accord W.
14th St. Commercial Corp. v. 5 W. 14th Owner's Corp., 815 F.2d 188, 193 (2d
Cir. 1987).
172. See Torres, 113 F.3d at 543.
173. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 811, 814
n.12 (1986).
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Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's view of congressional inaction as an implicit refusal to grant jurisdiction over the federal
common law of foreign relations suggests that no claim impacting U.S. foreign relations could be substantial enough under
Merrell Dow to support federal question jurisdiction. 1 74 Thus, a
narrow reading would deny federal jurisdiction even in extreme
cases in which private international litigation would have a potentially devastating effect on a foreign state's economy, political structure, or sovereignty. An analysis of factors including
the impact on a state's economy, the state's participation in and
regulation of a particular industry, and its resistance to the
litigation is better suited to pragmatic determinations of when
such litigation might present a substantial question of federal
law. Further, while congressional inaction may weaken the argument for complete preemption removal, 175 it is less persuasive as a ground for refusing to examine the plaintiff's complaint for a substantial federal issue giving rise to federal
question jurisdiction. Other areas of federal common law support federal question jurisdiction without explicit congressional
approval. 176 Indeed, the cause of action at issue in Patrickson
arguably presents a "substantial" issue of federal law under
both the narrow and broad interpretations of Merrell Dow:177
the court could have read the federal common law of foreign relations as a federal right of action created by the judiciary and
giving rise to a substantial issue of federal law. Instead, this
approach concludes that Congress's failure to speak directly to
the jurisdictional question is an indication of its intent to exclude federal question jurisdiction under the common law of
foreign relations.
As with dormant federal powers, this congressional silence
could be read in part as congressional inertia-an implicit invitation to courts to fill gaps unless and until Congress speaks to
the issue.1 78 To the extent that the federal common law of for174. See Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 803 ("[Wle see no logical connection between... an effect [on foreign relations] and the assertion of federal-question

jurisdiction.").
175. But see Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 9 n.5 (2003) (permitting removal under complete preemption despite a lack of congressional
intent to allow removal); infra Part II.A.3.
176. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972).
177. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
178. See Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1630-31 n.56 (noting congressional
power to override Court decisions in foreign affairs "flow[ing] from the justification for federal judicial lawmaking... which is the protection of political
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eign relations is premised on a structural delegation of consti179
congressional silence with retutional power to the courts,
spect to the multifactor approach may indicate Congress's implicit approval of a more expansive reading of the federal
common law of foreign relations. In either case, the Ninth Circuit's narrow reading of the well-pleaded complaint rule sugdoctrine. 80
gests a broad rejection of the federal common law
An expansive approach to the federal common law of foreign relations has been steadily refined as its application has increased, suggesting that as use of the federal common law of
foreign relations continues, courts will develop their analysis to
accommodate competing interests of federalism and political
branch power.' 8 ' Thus, determining whether a substantial federal issue is present under the federal common law of foreign
relations should depend on a court's case-by-case analysis of
foreign policy implications. This analysis should take into account pragmatic considerations such as increased caseloads
and the necessity of a federal forum, and policy considerations
interests involved and the
such as the strength of the8 federal
2
relations.
impact on foreign
3.

The Complete Preemption Alternative

8 3
offers an alternative
Dormant foreign affairs preemption
claim implicating
law
state
a
when
approach to determining
The Supreme
question.
federal
a
presents
foreign relations
affairs power
foreign
dormant
the
of
Court's recent treatment
relations
foreign
to
subject
is
law
state
a
has clarified when

branch prerogatives").
179. See id.
180. See Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 803 (9th Cir. 2002),
affd in part, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
181. Compare Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 62 (S.D. Tex.
1994) (treating the official protests of foreign governments as sufficient to
raise a federal question and support removal under the federal common law of
foreign relations), with Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542-43
(5th Cir. 1997) (stating that a foreign state's expressed interest in the litigation is not by itself sufficient to create a federal question under the federal
common law of foreign relations).
182. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 33, at 931 (noting wide discretion to
tailor "arising under" jurisdiction to the "practical needs of the particular
situation") (citing Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813
n.12 (1986); William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a
Case Arise "Directly"Under FederalLaw, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 (1967)).
183. See supra Part I.D.2 (describing the Court's dormant foreign affairs
preemption jurisprudence).
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preemption, absent explicit political branch action. 8 4 A narrow
reading 8 5 of dormant foreign affairs preemption requires balancing legislation in areas of traditional state competence
against federal interests in uniformity. 8 6 The Garamendi
Court nonetheless affirmed its power to independently assess
foreign relations implications, and to find state laws preempted
absent explicit conflict with executive or congressional ac18 7
tion.
The Court's reading of a broad foreign relations field suggests an alternative ground for removal under complete preemption.' 8 8 While cases may not be removed to federal court
solely on the basis of a federal defense, 8 9 defendants may remove where a federal statute is intended to exclude state
causes of action.190 To the extent that the post-Beneficial understanding of complete preemption blurs the line between
complete and field preemption,' 9 ' it suggests that a broad reading of the foreign affairs power exclusive of state action may
provide a sufficient basis for removal. That is, complete preemption may be warranted as a matter of constitutional law
where the text or structure of the Constitution itself intends
federal power exclusive of the states. 192 Similarly, the federal
common law of foreign relations-premised on a robust foreign
relations field and an independent judicial assessment of foreign policy implications subject to congressional review-may
serve as a basis for complete preemption removal to federal

184. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 (2003).
185. Id. This narrow reading is that of Justice Harlan in Zschernig, whose
concurring opinion sought to establish the higher standard of conflict preemption in the Court's dormant foreign affairs analysis, rather than the majority's
field preemption. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 459 (1968) (Harlan, J.,

concurring).
186. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.l.
187. Id. at 428-30.
188. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-66 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 25-27 (1983);
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 559-60 (1968).

189.

See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260

(1916).

190. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9 n.5 (2003).
191. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing the implications of Beneficial on the
complete preemption doctrine).

192. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 56, at 163-65 (noting that even absent
federal action the foreign affairs power may be read to exclude state action in
the interest of national uniformity in foreign relations).
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court. 193 This approach is problematic because the federal
common law of foreign relations is judge-made law-no congressional intent to preempt state law exists under the doctrine-and complete preemption removal has generally been
reserved for instances in which federal legislation explicitly
94
Further, while dormant foreign
seeks to exclude state law.
affairs preemption generally applies to state laws that intrude
on foreign policy, 1 95 the federal common law of foreign relations
applies to traditional state law claims that impact a foreign
state's vital economic or sovereign interests when litigated by
196
foreign parties.
Nonetheless, complete preemption removal under the
Court's dormant foreign affairs power is helpful as an analogy
to removal under the federal common law of foreign relations.
To the extent complete preemption constitutes an "exception" to
the well-pleaded complaint rule, one might argue that removal
under the federal common law of foreign relations similarly obviates the need for a congressionally created federal remedy,
197
In other
given the strength of the federal foreign affairs field.
relaforeign
impact
substantially
that
words, state law claims
they
because
jurisdiction
question
federal
tions will warrant
foreign
broad
the
by,
preempted
completely
impinge on, and are
affairs powers of the political branches. An expansive approach
to the federal common law of foreign relations allows courts the
discretion to determine when such claims are sufficiently substantial to present a federal question by implicating the foreign
affairs powers. The question remains, however, at what point a
state law claim impacting foreign relations becomes substantial
enough to arise under the federal common law of foreign relations.

193.

See, e.g., Marcos v. Republic of Philippines, 806 F.2d 344, 354 (2d Cir.

1986) (citing FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23; Avco Corp., 376 F.2d at 340).
194. See Anderson v. H & R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1043 (11th Cir.
2002), rev'd sub nom. Beneficial Nat7 Bank, 539 U.S. at 1.
195. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 417-18 (2003);
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376 (2000).
196. However, one may argue that a prohibition on state law claims implicating foreign relations is analogous to state legislation in the foreign affairs
field, which is prohibited under the dormant foreign affairs power. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417-18; see also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440
(1968) (stating that "judicial criticism of nations" under state laws is grounds
for preempting those laws).
197. Indeed, this was one of the possible approaches suggested by the Marcos court. 806 F.2d at 354.
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B. A MULTIFACTOR APPROACH TO THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

The dispute over the federal common law of foreign relations is less about the validity of the doctrine, 198 and more
about the threshold determination of when a claim implicates
the federal common law of foreign relations and becomes sufficiently substantial to support federal question jurisdiction. A
narrow reading of the federal common law of foreign relations
limits this determination to claims that involve an act of a foreign state, 199 while an expansive application finds a federal
question for claims that impact the vital economic or sovereign
interests of a foreign state. 200 While the narrow approach creates an administrable bright-line rule, courts must recognize
the increasing possibility that domestic litigation will substantially impact a foreign state's economic and sovereign interests.
At the same time, globalization is increasingly commonplace.
Criticisms of the federal common law of foreign relations raise
legitimate concerns that most, if not all, private international
litigation will have at least some impact on economic or sovereign interests abroad. The question is where to draw the line.
1. The Advantages of a Multifactor Approach
An expansive approach relies on a multifactor, case-by-case
analysis to determine when a state law claim sufficiently implicates foreign relations to constitute a federal question under
the federal common law of foreign relations.201 Such an approach should generally take into consideration: (1) the overall
economic impact of litigation on the foreign state; (2) the foreign state's participation in and regulation of the affected industry; (3) the foreign state's purported interest in and protests
to the litigation; and (4) the traditional state interests involved
in adjudicating the dispute.

198. See Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2001)
(stating that if a claim arises under the federal common law created in Sabbatino, then federal courts will have federal question jurisdiction), affd in
part, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
199. See id.
200. See, e.g., Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377-79 (11th
Cir. 1998); Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir.
1997).
201. See Torres, 113 F.3d at 542-43; see also supra notes 87-90, 164, and
accompanying text.

2005]

FEDERALIZING FOREIGNRELATIONS

1493

Application of these factors allows courts to make pragmatic determinations about when the federal interest in national uniformity presents a federal question. A multifactor approach relies on and encourages the development of the
judiciary's competence to gauge the foreign policy implications
of litigation, an area of jurisprudence that seems likely to grow
as litigation becomes increasingly global. This approach poses
little risk of imposing itself on political branch hegemony in foreign affairs-the federal common law of foreign relations is exercised, and justified, in view of congressional silence, subject
to review and revision by the political branches. Moreover, expansive jurisdiction ensures uniformity in foreign relations by
preventing divergent state court rulings from imposing conflicting obligations on foreign states.
2. Applying Expansive Jurisdiction in Foreign Relations
Courts confronted with a defense invoking the federal
common law of foreign relations must decide whether the issue
litigated is sufficiently substantial to constitute a federal question. In so doing, courts should apply a multifactor approach to
determine whether a state law claim implicates the federal
common law of foreign relations by examining the effects of the
litigation on a state's economic and sovereign interests, the
state's protests to the lawsuit, and the federal and state interests involved in adjudication. A multifactor approach recognizes the increasing possibility that some state law claims will
substantially impact foreign economic and sovereign interests.
As such, these state law claims constitute a substantial federal
question, supporting federal jurisdiction under § 1331.
Gauging the Impact on Economic and Sovereign Interests
Courts confronted with a defense invoking the federal
common law of foreign relations should examine the possible
economic and sovereign impact of such litigation on a foreign
state. Because very few cases have found the requisite impact
20 2
there is no judicial
to invoke federal question jurisdiction,
benchmark that triggers the federal common law of foreign relations. Indeed, the shortage of successful claims under the federal common law of foreign relations suggests that criticism of
an expansive approach on grounds of federalism and separation
of powers is generally unfounded. Nonetheless, judicial concern
a.

202.

See, e.g., Torres, 113 F.3d at 543.
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that litigation will disrupt federal uniformity in foreign affairs
must be more than speculative, and should be based on a finding that the litigation will impact "vital" economic and sovereign interests. 203 Indeed, it is critical that a suit impact both
economic and sovereign interests-economic considerations,
such as the size of the regulated industry or the industry's contribution to a foreign state's gross domestic product or export
income, 204 serve primarily to underscore the impact on foreign
state sovereignty. Thus, courts should similarly examine the
foreign state's participation in and regulation of the particular
area of litigation.
These considerations constitute a judicial determination
that a state law claim may be transformed into a federal question by virtue of its potential impact on foreign relations. As
such, courts examine economic and sovereign interests as a
variation on Merrell Dow and the well-pleaded complaint
rule. 20 5 Analysis of when a federal issue raises a substantial
federal question is precisely the kind of judicial determination
courts are competent to make. That particular issues touch foreign policy considerations is wholly relevant to determining
whether those claims present substantial issues of federal law,
and favors the independent judicial assessment of the federal
common law of foreign relations.
b. Protests by Foreign Governments to State Litigation
A multifactor approach should take into consideration protests by a foreign state to the litigation in determining whether
a state law claim presents a federal question under the federal
common law of foreign relations. 20 6 However, such protests are
not dispositive, and critiques have correctly warned against allowing foreign states to dictate a forum merely by expressing
some interest in the litigation. 207 Rather, protests and complaints by foreign states should serve to alert courts to the possibility that state law claims substantially intrude into federal
foreign relations by impacting that state's vital economic and
sovereign interests.
203.

Id.

204. See id. at 542-43.
205. See supra Part II.A.2.
206. See, e.g., Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377-79 (11th
Cir. 1998).
207. See Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 804 (9th Cir. 2002),
affd in part, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
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c. Balancing State and FederalInterests
A multifactor approach to determining when a claim arises
under the federal common law of foreign relations is supported
208 In
by recent dormant foreign affairs preemption analysis.
particular, analysis of when a claim impacts foreign relations
such that it becomes a substantial issue of federal law should
examine both the state and federal interests in adjudicating the
claim. Taking into consideration Garamendi's apparent reluctance to preempt state law under a broad foreign relations
field,20 9 courts should assess when claims arise under the fed-

eral common law doctrine in part by using a balancing test
when
similar to that suggested by the Court in determining
210
power.
affairs
foreign
the
by
preempted
is
action
state

21 1
Similar to the analysis suggested in Garamendi, courts

could weigh the state's interest, along with its traditional competence to regulate the law at issue, against the importance of
the federal interests in question. 212 Thus, where state legisla213
tion does not address a "traditional state responsibility," but
implicates foreign affairs and has a substantial impact on foreign states, defendants might remove under the federal common law of foreign relations by analogy to "complete preemp214 Despite the
tion" under dormant foreign affairs preemption.
lack of express congressional intent to preempt the state law at
issue, the federal common law of foreign relations is itself the
product of an exclusive foreign affairs power. The doctrine reflects a broad policy concern for national uniformity in foreign
relations, and is based on implicit congressional approval of independent judicial determinations in foreign policy, subject to
congressional revision. 2 15 Although the analogy between the
federal common law of foreign relations and foreign affairs preemption is an imperfect one, it rightly suggests a balancing of
state and federal interests in controlling adjudication to further
a policy of uniformity in foreign relations.

208. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing the development and recent treatment of dormant foreign affairs preemption).
209. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419-25 (2003).
210. See id.
211. See id. at 419 n.l1.
212. See id.
213. Id.
214. See supra Part II.A.3.
215. See supra Part I.D.1.
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CONCLUSION
The federal common law of foreign relations provides a jurisdictional hook for state law claims that implicate U.S. foreign relations, allowing defendants to remove those claims to
federal court. Courts have struggled to define both the point at
which claims impacting foreign affairs trigger the federal common law of foreign relations, and the type of impact substantial
enough to warrant federal question jurisdiction. In view of political branch authority over foreign relations, state law claims
that impact foreign relations impinge on the federal field of foreign affairs, giving rise to a federal issue sufficient for removal
under the common law doctrine. Although domesticinternational distinctions continue to blur, and most private international litigation in the United States has some impact on
foreign states, the impact will at times be substantial enough to
warrant federal uniformity. An expansive treatment of the federal common law of foreign relations, one which grants federal
question jurisdiction over claims implicating foreign economic
and sovereign interests, is consistent with recent foreign affairs
jurisprudence and recognizes the practical necessity of effective
management of such global litigation. A multifactor approach
provides the optimal framework for assessing claims implicating U.S. foreign affairs. This approach properly relies on judicial competence to assess and gauge economic effects, poses little threat to political branch hegemony in foreign affairs, and
allows courts to grapple with and refine the appropriate standards through a judicial common law process.

